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ENVELOPE
CDSN = LGX596 MCN = 92157/43623 TOR = 921572233
OTTCZYUW RUEKJCS1938 1572230-CCCC--RUEALGX.
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HEADER
O 052230Z JUN 92
FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEADWD/PTC WASH DC
RUFGAID/USEUCOM AIDES VAIHINGEN GE
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
RULSJGA/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
RULKNIS/COMNISCOM WASHINGTON DC//NAVATAC//
RUEADTS/USDP:DTSA/MAG
RUDOGHA/USNMR SHAPE BE//SURVEY//
RUWTPGA/12 AF BERGSTROM AFB TX//IN//
RUEOACC/CDRPSYOPGP FT BRAGG NC//AORC-POG-SB//
RUANJTF/CJTF FOUR
RUWANGC/CJTF FIVE//J20//
RUWSMXI/AMC INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//IN//
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//
RUWANTX/CJTF SIX
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FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0534
INFO RHEHOND/ONDCP WASHDC IMMEDIATE
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RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 5227
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 4257
RUEHNA/DEAHQS WASHDC
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//SCJ2/POLAD//
RUEHGT/AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA 1684
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 1641
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 2293
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 0301
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CONTROLS
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 LA PAZ 009171

DEPT FOR INM AND ARA/AND; ALSO PLEASE PASS TO USAID/LAC
NSC FOR BEERS; DEA FOR OC/NIEVES AND OF/MAHER
GUATEMALA FOR AMSELEM

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
IS/FPC/CDR Date: 5/26/95
(X) RELEASE (X) DECLASSIFY
( ) EXCISE ( ) DECLASSIFY IN PART
( ) DENY
( ) DELETE Non-Responsive Info
FOIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions
MR Cases Only:
EO Citations
( ) CLASSIFY as ( ) S or ( ) C OADR
( ) DOWNGRADE TS to ( ) S or ( ) C OADR
TS authority to:

/**** ****** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/
BODY
TAGS: PREL, SNAR, PGOV, PINR, EAID, BL, US
SUBJECT: GOB PRESSES FOR "REALISTIC" COCA ERADICATION
- TARGET

REF: A) LA PAZ 8969, B) LA PAZ 8964
- C) 91 LA PAZ 19756 (NOTAL)

1. CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY
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2. ON JUNE 4, THE AMBASSADOR HOSTED A LUNCHEON BRIEFING FOR SENIOR KEY GOB OFFICIALS TO REVIEW PROBLEMS WITH THE GOB'S COCA ERADICATION PROGRAM, SUGGEST SOLUTIONS, AND FORCEFULLY REITERATE THE IMPORTANCE OF A VIGOROUS ERADICATION PROGRAM TO BOLIVIA'S OVERALL COUNTERNARCOTICS (CN) CREDIBILITY. PRESENT WERE FOREIGN MINISTER RONALD MACLEAN, INTERIOR MINISTER CARLOS SAAVEDRA, FINANCE MINISTER JORGE QUIROGA AND SUBSECRETARIES JOSE SALINAS (ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT, AGRICULTURE MINISTRY) AND GONZALO TORRICO (SOCIAL DEFENSE, INTERIOR MINISTRY). OUR BRIEFING STRESSED THAT AT THE CURRENT RATE (APPROXIMATELY 350 HA PER MONTH, THE GOB WOULD ERADICATE LESS THAN 4000 HA OF COCA BY DECEMBER 31. A RATE OF 710 HA PER MONTH FOR THE REST OF THE YEAR WOULD BE NEEDED TO ACHIEVE THE 6400 HA TARGET PROPOSED IN THE DRAFT FY92 ESF AGREEMENT. BASED ON THE PREMISE THAT THE GOB WAS NOT DOING ALL IT COULD TO ERADICATE COCA, THE BRIEFING RECOMMENDED THAT AN "EMERGENCY PLAN" TO RIGOROUSLY ENFORCE THE GOB'S OMNIBUS CN LAW (LAW 1008) BE IMPLEMENTED IMMEDIATELY. THE AMBASSADOR ALSO DISCUSSED OUR BILATERAL PROSECUTORS PROGRAM AND THE GOB'S REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE FOR PRISON CONSTRUCTION.

3. THE BOLIVIANS REPLIED THAT, HISTORICALLY, THE GOB HAD MADE GREAT STRIDES IN ERADICATION, THAT ERADICATION FIGURES WERE OVEREMPHASIZED BY THE USG AND THAT A 6400 HA OR EVEN 6000 HA TARGET FOR 1992 WAS IMPOSSIBLE. THEY PROPOSED A LOWER, "MORE REALISTIC" TARGET WITH COMMENSURATELY LESS ESF DISBURSED THROUGHOUT THE YEAR, BUT WITH THE BALANCE RETAINED AS A "BONUS PLAN" IF THEY EXCEED THE REDUCED ERADICATION TARGET (SEPTEL). THEY ALSO PROPOSED SENDING A GOB DELEGATION TO WASHINGTON TO EXPLAIN BOLIVIA'S SIDE OF THE CN STORY TO ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS, MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND KEY STAFFERS. THE GOB CONTINUES TO CAST ITS CN EFFORTS IN THE BEST POSSIBLE

LIGHT, AND MAY NOT APPRECIATE THE DIFFICULTIES IN SELLING THE "LESS ERADICATION-LESS ESF" COCA ERADICATION PROPOSAL, ESPECIALLY WITH USG QUESTIONS LINGERING ABOUT EXTRADITION AND THE SURRENDERED TRAFFICKERS. HOWEVER, WE WERE STRUCK BY THE MATURE APPROACH OF THESE INFLUENTIAL GOB CABINET MINISTERS, WHO SEEM TO REJECT THE BOLIVIAN "TIN CUP" SYNDROME TO USG ASSISTANCE. WE BELIEVE THE "LESS-LESS" APPROACH IS WORTHY OF SERIOUS CONSIDERATION. END SUMMARY.

COCA AND CREDIBILITY

4. ON JUNE 4, THE AMBASSADOR HOSTED A LUNCHEON BRIEFING AT HIS RESIDENCE FOR SENIOR KEY GOB OFFICIALS TO REVIEW PROBLEMS WITH THE GOB'S COCA ERADICATION PROGRAM, SUGGEST SOLUTIONS, AND FORCEFULLY REITERATE THE IMPORTANCE OF A VIGOROUS ERADICATION PROGRAM TO BOLIVIA'S OVERALL COUNTERNARCOTICS (CN) CREDIBILITY. PRESENT WERE FOREIGN MINISTER RONALD MACLEAN, INTERIOR MINISTER CARLOS SAAVEDRA, FINANCE MINISTER JORGE QUIROGA AND SUBSECRETARIES JOSE SALINAS (ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT, AGRICULTURE MINISTRY) AND GONZALO TORRICO (SOCIAL DEFENSE, INTERIOR MINISTRY). WITH THE AMBASSADOR WERE THE ADCM (USAID MISSION DIRECTOR), NAS CHIEF, DEA ACA, MILGROUP ARMY SECTION CHIEF AND POLOFF. THE ERADICATION BRIEFING WAS PREPARED AND PRESENTED BY THE MILGROUP OFFICER, WHO HAD BEEN TASKED BY THE AMBASSADOR WITH HELPING THE GOB RE-ENERGIZE ITS PROGRAM (AND WHO HAD SPENT SEVERAL RECENT WEEKS IN THE CHAPARE EXAMINING ALL ASPECTS OF THE ERADICATION ISSUE). THE BRIEFING'S CONTENTS HAD BEEN VETTED AND THOROUGHLY DISCUSSED EARLIER BY THE COUNTRY TEAM. THE AMBASSADOR ALSO USED THE LUNCHEON TO FOLLOW UP SOME GOB CN "CONCERNS" RAISED BY SAAVEDRA ON JUNE 1 (REF A).

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 ******/

ERRATIC ERADICATION

5. OUR BRIEFING STRESSED THAT AT THE CURRENT RATE (APPROXIMATELY 350 HA PER MONTH, THE GOB WOULD ERADICATE LESS THAN 4000 HA OF COCA BY DECEMBER 31, FAR SHORT OF THE 5486 HA ERADICATED IN 1991. TO ACHIEVE THE 6400 HA TARGET PROPOSED IN THE DRAFT FY92 ESF AGREEMENT, THE GOB WOULD HAVE TO AVERAGE 710 HA ERADICATED/MONTH FOR THE REST OF THE YEAR. (THE GOB APPROACHED THIS RATE BRIEFLY IN JULY-AUGUST 1991, DURING A SHORT-LIVED AGGRESSIVE INVOLUNTARY ERADICATION CAMPAIGN.) THE BRIEFING EMPHASIZED THAT ERADICATION WAS LAGGING BEHIND INTERDICTION AND

ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT, WHICH MEANT THAT THE GOB'S THREE-LEGGED CN STRATEGY "STOOL" WAS IMBALANCED. DOMESTICALLY, SLOW COCA ERADICATION WEAKENED THE GOB'S INTEGRATED CN STRATEGY. INTERNATIONALLY, IT JEOPARDIZED FY91 AND FY92 USG ASSISTANCE AND TARNISHED THE GOB'S CN IMAGE AND CREDIBILITY.

6. THE BRIEFING ALSO EXPLAINED THAT NOT ALL CAMPESINO COCA GROWERS WERE ALIKE. SOME "CONVENTIONAL" FARMERS HAD ALREADY ERADICATED THEIR COCA. OTHER LESS SUCCESSFUL FARMERS GREW SOME COCA AS A HEDGE AGAINST LOSSES ON OTHER CROPS. A THIRD GROUP -- A "CRIMINAL ELEMENT" -- GREW COCA ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE RELATIVELY QUICK AND EASY PROFITS TO BE MADE. THE SECOND GROUP WAS A PRIME TARGET FOR ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE; THE THIRD GROUP, FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT (AND FORCED ERADICATION). AS THE BRIEFING POINTED OUT, THE GOB'S OWN OMNIBUS ANTI-NARCOTICS STATUTE (LAW 1008) REQUIRED THAT BETWEEN 5000 AND 8000 HA OF EXCESS (ILLEGAL) COCA BE ERADICATED EACH YEAR.

7. BASED ON THE PREMISE THAT THE GOB WAS NOT DOING ALL IT COULD TO ERADICATE COCA, THE BRIEFING RECOMMENDED THAT AN "EMERGENCY PLAN," TO RIGOROUSLY ENFORCE LAW 1008, BE IMPLEMENTED IMMEDIATELY. THE PLAN INCLUDED:

-- COMPLETING A SURVEY TO ACCURATELY IDENTIFY (AND LATER ERADICATE) NEW COCA;

-- ISSUING DOCUMENTATION TO LEGAL GROWERS AND GIVING ILLEGAL (NEW COCA) GROWERS A SHORT-TERM, FIXED DEADLINE TO ERADICATE;

-- FORCIBLY ERADICATING THE COCA OF ANY GROWERS OF NEW COCA WHO DID NOT COMPLY, INCLUDING ADDING MORE PROSECUTORS AND BEEFING UP REGULAR (INSTEAD OF NARCOTICS POLICE) PROTECTION FOR ERADICATION TEAMS;

-- EXPANDING AND BETTER TARGETING PUBLIC RELATIONS PROGRAMS ABOUT LAW 1008 WITH CAMPESINO GROUPS; AND

-- MORE CLOSELY LINKING ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS TO ERADICATION (E.G., CONCENTRATE ON SMALL AREAS OR SINGLE COMMUNITIES).

THE BRIEFING CONCLUDED WITH PRESIDENT JAIME PAZ ZAMORA'S JUNE 2 STATEMENT (REF A) URGING CONTINUED BOLIVIAN CN EFFORTS, COGNIZANT OF WHAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THOUGHT OF BOLIVIA. (PAZ ZAMORA'S FOLLOWED THE AMBSSSADOR'S JUNE 1 VISIT WHICH EMPHASIZED, INTER ALIA, THE IMPORTANCE OF COCA ERADICATION TO BOLIVIA'S INTERNATIONAL IMAGE - REF B.)

GOB VIEW: ERADICATION GLASS IS (ALWAYS) HALF FULL

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8. TAKING THE LEAD IN RESPONSE (WHICH HE DID THROUGH MOST OF THE LUNCHEON, DESPITE THE MORE SENIOR MACLEAN'S PRESENCE), SAAVEDRA ARGUED THAT TO CONCENTRATE ON ONLY 1991-1992 WAS TO MISS THE POINT. USING GOB LOGIC WE'VE HEARD BEFORE, HE POINTED TO THE NEARLY 20000 HA ERADICATED SINCE 1988. (MOST OF THAT, HE TOOK PAINS TO MENTION, HAD BEEN ERADICATED DURING THE PAZ ZAMORA ADMINISTRATION.) GIVEN THE TOTAL OF 25000-30000 HA (SIC) OF COCA IN THE

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 ******/
CHAPARE, THE GOB HAD ERADICATED THE EQUIVALENT OF AT LEAST TWO-THIRDS OF THE ILLEGAL COCA, BUT NO ONE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT FACT, ACCORDING TO SAAVEDRA. (COMMENT: HE DID NOT MENTION THE PROBLEMS OF NEW COCA OR NET ERADICATION. END COMMENT.)

9. SAAVEDRA WENT ON THE CLAIM THAT THE GOB HAD "WILLINGLY FOREGONE" THE POTENTIAL EARNINGS FROM THIS COCA IN ORDER TO IMPROVE ITS INTERNATIONAL IMAGE AND TO FULFILL ITS INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS. IN ADDITION, SAAVEDRA MAINTAINED THAT LAW 1008 WAS "BRUTAL" AND "NEVER WOULD HAVE BEEN PASSED" IN COUNTRIES LIKE MEXICO AND THE U.S. TAKING A POTSHOT AT USG ASSISTANCE, HE CONCLUDED THAT LAW 1008 MANDATED COCA ERADICATION, BUT ALSO ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT, IN A RATIO "THAT COULD BE INTERPRETED" AS ONE-TO-ONE. SAAVEDRA WANTED TO SEE AN "ARMY" OF AGRONOMISTS AND ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT EXPERTS FOLLOWING THE "ARMY" OF POLICE AND DEA PERSONNEL OPERATING IN THE CHAPARE.

10. COMMENT: THE OTHER MINISTERS DID NOT SEEM TO SHARE SAAVEDRA'S LEGALISTIC ONE-FOR-ONE INTERPRETATION. ALSO, JUST HAVING LAW 1008 ON THE BOOKS IS NOT ENOUGH; THE LAW MUST BE ENFORCED. AT LEAST ONE BOLIVIAN DEPUTY, CONSTITUTION COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN LUIS VASQUEZ, HAS RAISED THIS POINT IN PUBLIC. RETURNING THE LAW TO CONGRESS FOR MODIFICATION, HOWEVER, WOULD BE EXTREMELY POLITICALLY RISKY AS SAAVEDRA TOLD THE AMBASSADOR. END COMMENT.

GOB VIEW: USG PLACES TOO MUCH EMPHASIS ON ERADICATION

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11. JOINED BY THE OTHER MINISTERS, SAAVEDRA REPEATED HIS JUNE 1 ARGUMENT (REF A) THAT THE USG, ESPECIALLY THE U.S. CONGRESS, PLACED TOO MUCH EMPHASIS ON COCA ERADICATION,

TAKING THE GOB'S CONSIDERABLE OTHER EFFORTS IN INTERDICTION AND ARRESTING TRAFFICKERS "COUNT FOR NOTHING." HE CONCLUDED THAT EVEN 5000 HA ERADICATED THIS YEAR, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE GOB'S OTHER EFFORTS ON INTERDICTION, SEIZURES AND ARRESTS, SHOULD BE SEEN AS SUFFICIENT; THE GOB HAD "DEALT A HARD BLOW" TO TRAFFICKERS. TORRICO ADDED THAT THE LARGE AMOUNT OF PRECURSER CHEMICALS AND COCA PASTE/BASE SEIZED ALREADY THIS YEAR HAD DAMAGED THE TRAFFICKING INDUSTRY. (COMMENT: WE RESPONDED THAT A SURER WAY TO DAMAGE TRAFFICKING WAS TO REMOVE THE PRIMARY RAW MATERIAL, COCA LEAF. END COMMENT.) REPEATING HIS OFFER OF JUNE 1, SAAVEDRA SUGGESTED THAT A GOB DELEGATION BE SENT TO WASHINGTON IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE TO GIVE BOLIVIA'S SIDE OF THE STORY TO SKEPTICAL ADMINISTRATION OFFICALS, MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND KEY STAFFERS. MACLEAN AND QUIROGA AGREED.

ERADICATION TARGET: TO REACH THE UNREACHABLE

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12. FOLLOWING SAAVEDRA'S LEAD, ALL THREE MINISTERS AND THE TWO SUBSECRETARIES ARGUED THAT 6400 OR EVEN 6000 HA WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO ERADICATE BY THE END OF THE YEAR. SALINAS REPEATED A FAMILIAR LITANY OF EXPLANATIONS: THE CHAPARE HAD BEEN SOAKED BY THE HEAVIEST RAINS IN YEARS; A SIX-WEEK LEADERSHIP VACUUM AT THE GOB'S COCA ERADICATION AGENCY, DIRECO, GOT ERADICATION OFF TO A SLOW START; THE EASY-TO-REACH COCA HAD BEEN ERADICATED, LEAVING COCA IN MORE ISOLATED REGIONS TO BE SURVEYED AND ERADICATED; AND MORE POLICE PROTECTION WAS NEEDED TO ACCOMPANY THE ERADICATION TEAMS.

13. QUIROGA CALLED FOR REACHABLE ERADICATION GOALS, PERHAPS INCLUDING SMALLER, MORE FREQUENT ESF DISBURSEMENTS IN ADVANCE OF ERADICATION. SAAVEDRA ARGUED (APPARENTLY WITHOUT CONSULTING QUIROGA OR ANY OTHER MEMBER OF THE ECONOMIC CABINET) THAT THE RELATIVELY SMALL AMOUNT OF ESF LOST IF THE GOB APPROACHED, BUT DID NOT REACH ITS ERADICATION TARGET WOULD MEAN "LITTLE" TO BOLIVIA (AND THUS WOULD NOT SERVE AS A SIGNIFICANT INCENTIVE TO REACH THE TARGET). HE SUGGESTED THAT A LOWER TARGET BE ESTABLISHED, INSTEAD, WITH A COMMENSURATE CUT IN ESF,

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 004 ******/
E.G., USDOLS 50 MILLION IN ESF FOR 5000 HA ERADICATED. THE BALANCE OF THE ESF (BASED ON THE FY92 PROPOSAL, USDOLS 16 MILLION) WOULD BE HELD AS AN INCENTIVE IF BOLIVIA EXCEEDED THE ERADICATION TARGET. (THIS OFFER IS ADDRESSED IN MORE DETAIL, SEPTEL.) THE STRENGTHS OF THIS PLAN, ACCORDING TO THE MINISTERS, WERE FIRST, THAT THE

ERADICATION TARGET WAS "VIRTUALLY GUARANTEED" AND SECOND, THAT IT WAS A SHIFT TO AN INCENTIVE-BASED APPROACH, WHICH WOULD CAST THE GOB'S ERADICATION EFFORTS IN A MORE POSITIVE LIGHT.

14. IN RESPONSE, AS THEY HAD EMPHASIZED THROUGHOUT THE LUNCHEON, THE AMBASSADOR AND ADCM DESCRIBED THE HARD MOOD IN WASHINGTON REGARDING BOLIVIA'S CN PERFORMANCE. THEY REMINDED THE MINISTERS THAT THE USG WAS LOOKING AT THE GOB'S CN EFFORTS AS A WHOLE. THERE HAD BEEN CONSIDERABLE INTERDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT SUCCESSES, PARTICULARLY DURING THE ON-GOING OPERATION GHOST ZONE, BUT SLOW COCA ERADICATION (FOR WHATEVER REASONS), INTERMINABLE DELAYS ON EXTRADITION AND RIDICULOUSLY LIGHT SENTENCES THUS FAR FOR SURRENDERED TRAFFICKERS ONLY DETRACTED FROM THOSE SUCCESSES.

15. THE AMBASSADOR AND ADCM ADDED THAT, BASED ON INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS WITH WASHINGTON, SAAVEDRA'S JUNE 1 PROPOSAL OF A 6000 HA TARGET WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR THE USG TO ACCEPT; A SMALLER FIGURE, EVEN WITH LESS ESF, WOULD ALSO BE DIFFICULT TO SELL. THEY WARNED THAT THE GOB WOULD DO EVEN MORE HARM TO ITS CN CREDIBILITY IF A LOWER ERADICATION OBJECTIVE WAS AGREED TO, BUT THEN NOT MET. THE MINISTERS SAID THEY UNDERSTOOD, AND SAAVEDRA SAID THE THREE WOULD BRIEF PAZ ZAMORA ON THE ERADICATION PROPOSAL AND THE NEED FOR A GOB DELEGATION TO WASHINGTON.

PROSECUTORS AND PRISONS (AGAIN)

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16. BEFORE THE LUNCHEON BRIEFING, THE AMBASSADOR DISCUSSED THE PROSECUTOR PROGRAM AND UNDCP ASSISTANCE WITH SAAVEDRA. REPLYING TO THE MINISTER'S "CONCERNS" OF JUNE 1 (REF A), THE AMBASSDADOR OFFERED TO ESTABLISH A BILATERAL WORKING GROUP TO REVIEW THE PROSECUTORS' (FISCALES) AGREEMENT SIGNED IN DECEMBER, 1991 (REF C). SAAVEDRA SAID HE WANTED THE FISCALES TO WORK "FOR HIM" (I.E., UNDER THE INTERIOR MINISTRY). HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HIS MINISTRY THEREFORE WOULD HAVE TO PAY THE FISCALES, BUT HE THOUGHT THAT WOULD BE POSSIBLE, IF THE NUMBERS WERE REDUCED TO BETWEEN SEVEN AND TEN.

17. ON PRISON CONSTRUCTION, THE AMBASSADOR OFFERED TO COORDINATE WITH THE LOCAL UNDCP REPRESENTATIVE TO HAVE FUNDS THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN USED FOR THE NOW-DEFUNCT UNDCP PROSECUTOR PROGRAM APPLIED TOWARDS BUILDING HIGH SECURITY SECTIONS OF PALMASOLA PRISON IN SANTA CRUZ AND OTHER PRISONS. (THIS HAS BEEN A RELENTLESS CRUSADE BY SAAVEDRA AND HIS WIFE, COORDINATOR OF THE NATIONAL PRISON WELFARE PROGRAM.) ON THE GOB'S THIRD CONCERN, THE PENDING USDOLS

15.8 MILLION ESF DISBURSEMENT, THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT REP. FEIGHAN AND ARA DAS MCLEAN WERE TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE.

18. COMMENT: THESE RESPONSES WERE INTENDED TO UNDERMINE SAAVEDRA'S EARLIER COMPLAINTS AND TO SHOW USG WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE; THE EXTRADITION, SURRENDEREE AND ERADICATION BURDENS, MEANWHILE, REMAIN ON THE GOB'S BACK. ON THE FISCALES, WE WOULD NOT WANT SAAVEDRA TO HAVE SUCH TIGHT CONTROL THAT COOPERATION WITH DEA WOULD BE JEOPARDIZED. ON THE OTHER HAND, CLEAR, CRISP LINES OF AUTHORITY POINTING BACK TO SAAVEDRA WOULD PREVENT HIS SIDESTEPPING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SURRENDEREE CASES AND BLAMING OTHERS. END COMMENT.

COMMENT: END OF TI "TIN CUP" SYNDROME?

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19. THE GOB CONTINUES TO PUT THE BEST POSSIBLE FACE ON ITS OVERALL CN PERFORMANCE (WHICH WE SEEM TO KNOW MORE ABOUT THAN MANY OF THE GOB'S OWN CABINET MINISTERS, AS THIS LUNCHEON ILLUSTRATED). SAAVEDRA'S VIEW OF HISTORY IS

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 005 ******/
NOT COMPLETELY REVISIONIST; THE GOB HAS MADE MAJOR STRIDES IN ITS CN EFFORTS IN RECENT YEARS. THE ERADICATION CHALLENGE MAY BE MORE DIFFICULT, BUT THE GOB IS BETTER EQUIPPED (THANKS TO EXTENSIVE USG ASSISTANCE) TO MEET THE CHALLENGE, A FACT THE BOLIVIAN MINISTERS TEND TO OVERLOOK. MEANWHILE, POLITICAL WILL CONTINUES TO LAG BEHIND TECHNICAL CAPABILITY (AND LIKELY WILL SLIP FURTHER AS MORE POLITICAL ATTENTION IS FOCUSED ON PREPARATIONS FOR THE 1993 ELECTIONS).

20. WE WERE STRUCK, HOWEVER, WITH A MORE MATURE TONE IN THIS CONVERSATION AND THE "LESS ERADICATION-LESS MONEY" PROPOSAL. SAAVEDRA, QUIROGA AND MACLEAN SEEMED TO ESCHEW THE GOB'S "TIN CUP" SYNDROME OF RECENT YEARS IN FAVOR OF COMPENSATION FOR GOALS ACTUALLY MET. THESE THREE ARE A LARGE PART OF THE GOB'S YOUNGER, MORE CAPABLE BRAIN TRUST AND WILL UNDOUBTEDLY TAKE OUR MESSAGE TO PAZ ZAMORA. THERE IS A RISK THAT THE GOB MAY ACCEPT LESS IN ESF DISBURSEMENTS FOR LESS ERADICATION, ONLY TO ARGUE FOR THE REMAINING ESF "BONUS" AS "COMPENSATION" FOR CN SUCCESSES IN OTHER AREAS (E.G., INTERDICTION). HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT THE "LESS-LESS" PROPOSAL IS WORTHY OF SERIOUS CONSIDERATION. DISBURSING USDOLS 50 MILLION FOR 5000 HA ERADICATED AND HOLDING THE USDOLS 16 MILLION BALANCE IN RESERVE AS A BONUS MAY BE THE BEST WAY TO ENCOURAGE THE GOB TO MORE VIGOROUSLY ERADICATE COCA AND TO SET SPECIFIC ERADICATION TARGETS. THE EMERGENCY PLAN WE PRESENTED MAY

BE THE VEHICLE TO DO THAT; WE WILL PUSH FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION. IF THE GOB WON'T "PLAY," WE DON'T "PAY."

BOWERS
ADMIN
BT

#1942

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